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Commentary
By Martin R. Gardner*
The Question of Parole t: A Review
One of the more remarkable recent developments in criminal
law thinking, advocated by theorists of diverse political persua-
sions,' is the dramatic shift away from justifying punishment sys-
tems in terms of the "rehabilitative ideal,"'2 with its attendant
concern for individualized dispositions of offenders through broad
judicial and administrative discretion and indeterminacy in sen-
tencing, toward models embodying blatantly punitive considera-
tions thought to promote justice or deterrence, or both.3 Because
the rehabilitative ideal presently permeates most punishment
schemes, the call to reform a variety of aspects of the criminal jus-
tice system has been sounded loudly.4 Much of the criticism cen-
ters on the perceived evils of current indiscriminate sentencing
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.S.,
1969, J.D., 1972, University of Utah. Fellow in Law and the Humanities, 1975-
76, Harvard University.
t THE QUESTION OF PAROLE. By Andrew von Hirsch & Kathleen J. Hanrahan.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger. 1979. Pp. 178. $15.50.
1. The development discussed in text infra, toward retributive theories of pun-
ishment is advocated by thinkers ranging from Ernest van den Haag to Alan
Dershowitz. See VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 176-77, 191-95 (1975);
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENC-
ING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976). As a member of the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force, Dershowitz apparently subscribes to its proposals
for "presumptive sentencing" based heavily on desert considerations. Id. at
18-26. For a discussion of concerns leading to such proposals, see Dershowitz,
Background Paper, in id. at 66.
2. The "rehabilitative ideal" characterizes the tradition of justifying incarcera-
tion in terms of its supposed beneficial effect of reducing crime through iso-
lating and rehabilitating offenders. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMIMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 13, 20 (1971). The rehabilitative goal of
prisons was strongly emphasized in the late 19th century as evidenced by the
words of an influential spokesman of the movement:
[A]ll persons in a state, who are convicted of crimes or offenses
before a competent court, shall be deemed wards of the state and
shall be committed to the custody of the board of guardians, until, in
their judgment, they may be returned to society with ordinary safety
and in accord with their own highest welfare.
Z. BROCKWAY, Fwtr YEARS OF PRISON SERVICE 401 (1912).
3. See notes 1-2 supra. See generally N. MoRRIs, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT
(1974); A. NEIER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1976); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT
CRIME (1975).
4. See notes 1-3 supra.
BOOK REVIEW
practices, viewed by the commentators as unprincipled and inef-
fective instruments to achieve rehabilitation, much less justice or
deterrence. Not surprisingly, the institution of parole, virtually
ubiquitous in America's penal system,5 has also come under fire.6
Perhaps the most thorough and systematic critique of parole in
light of the new retributive thinking is Andrew von Hirsch and
Kathleen J. Hanrahan's new book, The Question of Parole. The
book is a natural outgrowth of von Hirsch's earlier work, Doing Jus-
tice,7 which develops a basically retributive theory of criminal
punishment.8 The upshot of Doing Justice is that offenders should
be punished if, and only if, they deserve to be.9 Because punish-
ment entails blame, its imposition is justified and its duration mea-
sured in correspondence to individual blameworthiness, defined
through assessing the seriousness of the offense and the culpabil-
ity of the offender.10 Moreover, justice requires equality of treat-
ment among similarly situated offenders committing the same
crime." Utilitarian concerns for rehabilitation, incapacitation of
dangerous offenders, and general and special deterrence are inap-
propriate in allocating punishment under the Desert Model of Do-
ing Justice.'2 Under this view, justice is more likely achieved
through adopting systems of '"presumptive" sentencing structured
by well-defined rules proportioning punishment commensurate to
the seriousness of crimes rather than relying on discretionary and
individualized dispositions of offenders.' 3 While Doing Justice fo-
cuses on the general problems of providing morally acceptable the-
ories justifying the institution and allocation of punishment, The
5. At least one state, Maine, has abolished parole. A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRA-
HAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE 1 (1979). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 17-
A, chs. 47-53 (1978) (no discussion of parole in the general sentencing provi-
sions).
6. See, e.g., J. MrrfoRD, KIND AND USUAL PUNisHMENT 294 (1973).
7. A. VON,HiRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter cited as DOING JUSTICE].
8. See Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing Jus-
tice, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 781.
9. Punishment, even if deserved, is unjustified if it is administered through in-
humane prison conditions. See DOING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 107-17.
10. The "seriousness" of a given offense is measured in terms of its harm: the
actual injury done or risked by the conduct. Id. at 79-80. "Culpability" is de-
fined as "the degree to which [an offender] may justly be held to blame for
the consequences or risks of his act." Id. at 80.
11. See id. at 72-74.
12. Doing Justice does allow for crime prevention as an appropriate goal for pun-
ishment in general, id. at 47, but the allocation of punishment to individuals
is to be based on desert considerations. Id. at 52, 70, 74-76.
13. Some minor deviations from the presumptive sentence for a given crime are
permitted if justified by aggravating or mitigating circumstances in particular
cases. Id. at 99-101. The range of permissible deviation from the presumptive
sentence is also fixed by rules. Id. at 100-01.
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Question of Parole examines the narrower issue of whether parole
would have a place in punishment systems built upon considera-
tions of justice.
Parole is assessed in terms of two justice-oriented conceptual
schemes, described as the "Desert" and "Modified Desert" mod-
els.14 The Desert Model, propounded in Doing Justice and favored
by von Hirsch and Hanrahan, rigorously follows the "principle of
commensurate deserts" in requiring equal punishment of those
whose criminal conduct is equally blameworthy. The Modified De-
sert Model permits some limited relaxation of the commensurate
deserts principle in particular cases in order to take into account
such considerations as the perceived need of incapacitation, the
possibilities of rehabilitation, or the likelihood of deterrence.15
Thus, under the Modified Desert Model, equally deserving offend-
ers may receive slightly different punishments if utilitarian con-
cerns are thought to be promoted thereby. The reason for positing
the Modified Desert concept as well as the preferable Desert
Model is to allow von Hirsch and Hanrahan to more fully examine
parole, not simply in terms of its justice, but also in terms of its
effectiveness in achieving its traditional goals-essentially utilita-
rian in nature.16
von Hirsch and Hanrahan provide a sketch of how the parole
system operates, noting that parole boards, not judges or legisla-
tures, generally determine the actual duration of an offender's in-
carceration. The practice in most jurisdictions is for the court to
impose a maximum sentence consistent with legislatively defined
punishment for the respective crime with the understanding that
the parole board is empowered to release the offender prior to the
expiration of the judicial maximum. In some jurisdictions the re-
lease may occur at any time prior to the expiration of the imposed
maximum, while in others it may occur only after the inmate has
served a specified fraction of the maximum sentence. Tradition-
ally, offenders are not even considered for parole until after they
have served substantial periods of confinement. Thus the inmate
does not know when to expect to be paroled until well into his or
her prison sentence. Moreover, the possibility of early knowledge
of the length of one's actual sentence is virtually eliminated by the
largely discretionary nature of the parole decision-making process.
Parole boards generally operate without explicit guidelines for re-
14. A. VON HmSCH & K. HANR , supra note 5, at 15-19.
15. The Modified Desert Model gives primacy to desert considerations in setting
the range of penalties applicable to conduct of a given degree of seriousness,
but utilitarian factors may be considered in fixing the specific penalty within
the range. Id. at 18.
16. Traditionally, parole has been supported as a means of achieving rehabilita-
tion and special deterrence. Id. at xiv.
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lease decisions, preferring to consider all "relevant" factors on a
case-by-case basis. 17 Once the board grants "parole release" end-
ing actual incarceration, a system of "parole supervision" operates
to regulate the parolee's conduct for the remainder of the unserved
sentence by requiring that the offender comply with the agreed-
upon conditions of parole. 18 A parolee's violation of any of these
conditions of parole supervision, discovered by parole officials
through a variety of surveillance techniques,19 can result in the pa-
role board's revocation of parole and the parolee's return to prison
for the remainder of his or her original sentence. While some pro-
cedural protections are required in revocation proceedings,2 0 much
of the process remains unstructured by guidelines defining the
board's revocation policies.
The hope for parole release prior to the maximum possible pe-
riod of confinement is thought to encourage inmates to cooperate
in prison rehabilitation programs. Parole board discretion in the
release decision supposedly assures that each inmate will be re-
leased only when his or her particular rehabilitative progress indi-
cates that commission of future crime is unlikely. Parole
supervision is believed to deter crime and crime-producing situa-
tions as well as to further rehabilitation.
von Hirsch and Hanrahan begin their critique of parole by con-
demning the practice of deferring the decision on actual sentence
length until the prisoner has served a substantial portion of the
sentence. This "deferred time-fix"'21 process finds no support from
the Desert Model. Deferring the decision creates undue suffering
by requiring the inmate to await information on the length of his or
her confinement when such decision, properly based entirely on
desert considerations knowable at the time of sentencing, could be
made at the very beginning of incarceration. No consideration of
justice is promoted by deferring the decision fixing sentence
length since no new knowledge pertaining to blameworthiness is
17. The concept of "relevance" is seldom defined. Id. at 2-3.
18. In addition to the obligation to abide by the law, parole conditions often in-
clude a variety of provisions requiring the parolee to engage in certain activi-
ties believed conducive to the development of a law-abiding nature and to
avoid others thought to be criminogenic. Id. at 3.
19. Unannounced visits by parole officers to the parolee's home or place of work
and report-gathering from his or her acquaintances are common methods of
assuring compliance with conditions of parole. Id. at xii.
20. Parolees are entitled to "probable cause" hearings to determine whether pa-
role violations have occurred. The parolee must receive written notice of the
hearing and its purpose, and of the alleged violations. He or she may call
witnesses and introduce evidence but need not necessarily be afforded coun-
sel. Id. at 50-51.
21. This useful phrase is coined by von Hirsch and Hanrahan. Id. at 27.
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likely to come to light after judicial sentencing.22 Ordinary con-
cerns for decency, a fundamental moral obligation,23 require that
the time-fix be made as early as possible and its terms immedi-
ately conveyed to the prisoner.
An early time-fix is also required under the Modified Desert
Model. Early determinations of sentence length can be made even
if sentencing is based on the perceived need to incapacitate dan-
gerous offenders since the information needed to make actuarial
predictions, the most reliable indicator of dangerousness, 24 is
available at the time of initial sentencing. The relevant informa-
tion necessary for clinical predictions of recidivism is also avail-
able at the sentencing stage should such evaluations be thought
necessary. Moreover, a delayed time-fix is not justified if rehabili-
tative concerns are thought relevant to sentencing because, in the
first place, little evidence exists to support the effectiveness of
prison rehabilitation programs.25 Even if such programs were suc-
cessful, there would not necessarily be any reason to affect the du-
ration of confinement in order to administer the programs since
the relationship between duration of confinement and success in
rehabilitation is not known. Furthermore, if such a relationship
could be shown, the factors establishing it would likely be known
at the time of sentencing. Finally, considerations of deterrence do
not support delaying the time-fix because there is no reason to
suppose that new knowledge about a penalty's deterrent effect
could be gained by waiting to fix the penalty until part of the sen-
tence is served. In short, deferring the time-fix achieves no utilita-
rian purpose 26 and offends human dignity by causing the prisoner
unnecessary anxiety and suffering awaiting notice of his or her
sentence.
The time-fix means that the prisoner will serve the sentence
stipulated. The Question of Parole allows for several situations,
22. Blameworthiness is a backward-looking consideration based on the serious-
ness of one's actions in light of his or her state of mind at the time the offense
is committed.
23. The argument for the early time-fix is based on obligations to uphold human
dignity rather than on principles of justice. The Question of Parole posits a
fundamental right to be treated with decency which takes priority over all
other moral obligations and penal goals. Id. at 9, 40.
24. Id. at 31-32.
25. Id. at 32-33.
26. If future evidence were to establish that information gathered during one's
incarceration did indeed enhance predictions of dangerousness, some devia-
tions from the early time-fix might be justified under the Modified Desert, but
not the Desert Model. Still, the offender could be given an early "presump-
tive time-fix" which would be deviated from only if subsequently available
information strongly altered the estimated probability of the offender's recid-
ivism. Id. at 35.
[Vol. 59:44
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however, in which deviations from the stipulated sentence are jus-
tified. If the serious-rating of an offender's crime is reduced and
the penalties for the offense greatly diminished during the time
the inmate is incarcerated, there is justification for reducing the
length of sentence since the redefinition of the crime makes it
doubtful that the offender ever deserved the original sentence.
Early releases are also justified if prisons become so crowded that
continued incarceration constitutes cruelty since the obligation to
avoid cruelty takes priority over all other considerations-even the
obligation to do justice.27 Early releases to avoid overcrowding
should be based on explicit guidelines defining overpopulation for
various types of institutions. Moreover, the practicalities of main-
taining prison discipline may require adopting administrative sys-
tems of "good-time" which reduce the length of sentence if the
inmate refrains from specified rule infractions. 28 Minor rule viola-
tions could result in loss of accumulated good-time and perhaps
even in slight extensions of the offender's initial term. Maximum
limits should be set on the amount of good-time that may be lost
(or "bad-time" that may be gained) so that an alleged violator can-
not be punished severely through administrative proceedings. Se-
rious crimes committed inside the institution deserve serious
additional punishment but should be dealt with as criminal, not
administrative, matters. If systems of good-time or bad-time are
adopted, they should be carefully detailed through specific guide-
lines defining how much good-time can be lost for which kinds of
infractions (or how much bad-time can be accumulated for which
kinds of infractions). The offender should be notified of the guide-
lines at or near the time of sentencing, thus respecting the require-
ment of an early time-fix. Thus, one would know at the beginning
of his or her sentence the date of release, which could be altered
only if one's offense is decriminalized, if severe overcrowding of
the prison occurs, if good-time credit (defined in specific rules)
supports an early release, or if subsequent violations of prison
rules and accumulated bad-time justifies extending the release
date.
The argument for an early time-fix does not necessarily mean
the immediate abandonment of parole release, however. While the
adoption of a system of early time-fixing could be adopted at sen-
tencing, thereby eliminating the present system of "dual time"
with purported judicial sentences and generally shorter "real"
sentences set by the parole board, political considerations pre-
clude a sudden embracing of a "real-time" model. Such a move
27. Id. at 9, 40.
28. It is essential that such infractions be specifically defined by rules in order to
put inmates on notice of conduct prohibited within the institution.
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would create the illusion of shifting toward leniency, while in fact
the system would be doing no more than fixing the actual confine-
ment usually served under the dual-time model. But the appear-
ance of leniency, to a public unsophisticated in matters of
sentencing and parole, might make the immediate switch to a real-
time approach unrealistic. For this reason, The Question of Parole
suggests retaining parole release, with an early time-fix based on
desert-based durational standards, until a gradual transition to
real-time can be effectuated.
von Hirsch and Hanrahan do not stop with suggesting reforms
of present parole release practices. Various aspects of parole su-
pervision also come under fire, particularly the practice of adminis-
tratively revoking parole when parolees are found committing new
crimes. Such administrative dispositions with lower standards of
proof and less adequate procedural protections than the criminal
process, 29 are inappropriate because they create a greater risk of
punishing the innocent than does the criminal process. Therefore,
the pursuit of justice requires that criminal charges brought
against parolees (while on parole) should be dealt with through
the criminal courts. Convictions, rather than revocations of previ-
ously granted parole, would result. Punishment would continue to
be proportioned to the gravity of the offense. This would avoid the
possibility, present under current administrative revocation pro-
ceedings, of minor crimes triggering disproportionately severe
punishment in the form of reincarceration for the remainder of a
lengthy, unexpired prior sentence from which parole had been
granted.
Not surprisingly, The Question of Parole also condemns as an
unjustified infringement of parolee liberty the practice of revoking
parole for technical violations of non-criminal parole conditions.
Evidence is lacking to establish that parole supervision of such
matters as the parolee's failure to seek employment prevents re-
cidivism or assists rehabilitation. Even if it could be shown that
parole supervision achieved deterrent or rehabilitative effects, rev-
ocation for violations of non-criminal conditions of parole consti-
tutes violation of the principle of commensurate deserts. This is
the case since the reimprisoned parolee is more severely punished
than a similarly situated offender who has been convicted of and
paroled for the same crime but who complies with parole condi-
tions and thus avoids reimprisonment. Treating the violation of
the parole conditions as itself worthy of punishment is, of course,
problematical since it is difficult to see how such "offenses" (e.g.,
29. A lower standard than "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is applied in revo-
cation proceedings. Id. at 52. For a review of procedural protections afforded
in revocation proceedings, see note 20 supra.
[Vol. 59:44
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failure to seek employment), even if committed by a parolee, war-
rant imprisonment. Hence, under the Desert Model, reimprison-
ment for violation of non-criminal conditions of parole constitutes
unjust punishment and must be avoided. Parole supervision and
revocation must therefore be abandoned under the Desert
Model.3 0
A somewhat different conclusion is reached when parole revo-
cation for non-criminal parole violation is scrutinized in terms of
the Modified Desert Model. If it could be shown that parole super-
vision is effective in achieving special deterrence or rehabilitation,
minor deviations from the principle of commensurate deserts
could be tolerated. Thus, consistent with the "Modified Desert
Model," violators of technical parole conditions might be given
brief periods of reconfinement if such could be justified on utilita-
rian grounds.
The Question of Parole recommends that special non-legislative
sentencing commissions be delegated responsibility for setting the
standards for duration of deserved confinement because legisla-
tures typically lack the time, resources, and expertise to carefully
draft adequate sentencing guidelines. Moreover, typical legislative
sympathy for the often emotional desires of many voters to "get
tough" with criminals through inflated penalties renders the task
of defining appropriate desert-based standards difficult at the leg-
islative level.
von Hirsch and Hanrahan are careful to point out that their sug-
gested parole reforms are viable only if the total desert-oriented
theory of punishment is implemented. Explicit standards gov-
erning confinement which parsimoniously prescribe imprison-
ment, particularly lengthy terms, are a precondition for the
implementation of the parole reforms. Otherwise, fixing terms at
an early date may result in an inflexible system of harsh punish-
ment untempered by mercy.
One wonders whether mercy is given adequate input even if all
the reforms of Doing Justice and The Question of Parole are
adopted. Suppose, for example, that a previously dangerous and
seemingly incorrigible offender experiences a religious conversion
and suddenly dedicates himself or herself to a life of good works
(an increasingly common phenomenon) shortly after beginning to
serve a prison sentence imposed through the early time-fix. As-
suming that at least some of these conversions are genuine, utilita-
30. The elimination of parole supervision must not detract from efforts to provide
social services assisting released prisoners' return to the community. Ex-
prisoners incur special social disabilities which require special services if re-
adjustment to normal social life is to be realized. No penalty should be im-
posed if an ex-prisoner desires not to accept the services offered. Id. at 73-80.
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rian considerations seem to support the immediate release of the
"born again" individual. Incapacitation and special deterrence
would no longer be necessary and rehabilitation would have been
achieved. Early release of the truly converted should not ad-
versely affect general deterrence since it is doubtful that potential
offenders would be induced to commit crimes with a plan of feign-
ing religious conversions in order to receive minimal punishment.
Even if such inducement did exist in a few cases, the pretended
conversion could often be detected. If it were not detected, the
term of punishment would effectively be reduced only once since
the feigner would be identified as such if incarcerated again subse-
quent to the "conversion."
Neither the Desert nor Modified Desert Models permits release
of inmates on the basis of information coming to light subsequent
to the time when sentence is fixed.31 Such late information is
deemed irrelevant to punishment as desert, and unnecessary in
structuring sentencing in light of utilitarian considerations. How-
ever, the example of the religiously converted inmate suggests
problems with the conclusion that the Modified Desert Model pre-
cludes deviation from the period set by the time-fix even in light of
facts subsequently arising.
The example also raises some interesting problems under a
strict desert system. If an individual becomes a "new person"
through a genuine conversion, in what sense does he or she "de-
serve" to be punished for acts committed by the old self? Even if
one concludes punishment is still somehow deserved, should not
compassion and mercy be permitted to temper the demands of jus-
tice in cases in which facts coming to light after sentencing indi-
cate a significant change for the better in the character of the
inmate?
Of course, such criticism could be leveled at any system of fixed
sentencing. There is always the danger that attempts to limit dis-
cretion and to do justice through rule-oriented punishment struc-
tures will result in rigid and harsh systems which unduly sacrifice
mercy and forgiveness, "unprincipled" virtues which escape cap-
ture through a priori rules. 32 Justice, after all, is but one of the
values which should shape the institution of punishment.
To the credit of The Question of Parole and its precursor, Doing
31. The Modified Desert Model allows for deviation from the fixed sentence
based upon information coming to light after sentence is fixed. See note 26
supra.
32. Mercy, compassion, forgiveness and their legal analogue, pardon, are matters
of grace, not of entitlement. Hence, they are necessarily ad hoc and discre-
tionary and cannot appropriately be defined through rules. See Morris, Per-
sons and Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 572-73 (1975).
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Justice, the primacy afforded the value of justice does not seem to
be exaggerated to the extent that other values are overridden.
Charity and compassion are reflected in the requirement of parsi-
mony in punishment. Peace and social order are promoted by en-
couraging special and general deterrence as well as incapacitation
of offenders through the system of fixed and certain punishment.
If examples like the religious conversion case expose imperfec-
tions in the von Hirsch and Hanrahan proposals, that should not be
surprising. Inevitably, there will be defects and weaknesses in any
punishment theory created by human minds in an imperfect
world. Presumably, von Hirsch and Hanrahan would be the first to
recognize as much.33
A more fundamental difficulty should be noted. Yet to be
worked out by either Doing Justice or The Question of Parole is the
problem of defining criminal responsibility in a desert-oriented
theory of criminal punishment. If all punishment must be de-
served to be justified, it seems necessary to reexamine substantive
criminal law defenses. For example, must the present medical
model of insanity be abandoned in favor of a broader responsibility
inquiry exculpating a defendant for social and economic depravity
as well as mental illness? 34 Does punishment as desert require
modifying the traditional view that ignorance of the law is gener-
ally no excuse? To what extent should the character of the actor as
well as the quality of his or her crime be taken into account in as-
sessing responsibility?
It is hoped von Hirsch and Hanrahan will soon address such
problems,35 for until a sound responsibility theory is worked out,
the theory of punishment espoused in The Question of Parole can
at best be only cautiously embraced.
However, if one shares the basic philosophical predicates of The
Question of Parole, its insistence that punishment be deserved,
parsimoniously administered and premised on strict requirements
of proof, the book's suggested reforms will likely seem sound and
acceptable. To others still committed to the rehabilitative ideal or
convinced that "get tough" attitudes need be adopted toward crim-
inal offenders, the suggested tamperings with parole will, at least
in part, appear undesirable. In any event, von Hirsch and Hanra-
33. Colleagues of von Hirsch on the Doing Justice project expressed their pro-
posals as follows: "What we offer are partial solutions, while awaiting more
insights, greater knowledge, and more complete answers in some hoped-for
future." DOING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at xxxix.
34. The author of this review has made such recommendations. See Gardner,
supra note 8, at 807-11.
35. A recent paper by von Hirsch discusses some of these problems. von Hirsch,
Prior Criminal Record (September 15, 1979) (unpublished memorandum to
Determinate Sentencing Project in possession of the author).
1980]
54 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW' (Vol. 59:44
han have produced a book which makes important contributions in
sharpening understanding and discussion of the role the increas-
ingly controversial institution of parole should play in the criminal
justice system.
